Month: January 2008

Haaretz: The seige of Gaza has failed

Haaretz has published an editorial today arguing that “The seige of Gaza has failed“. Here are some excerpts:

“The situation that arose once the Egypt-Gaza border was flung wide open has apparently not yet penetrated Israeli consciousness. While politicians and the media are waiting with bated breath for publication of the Winograd report on the Second Lebanon War, a new situation is taking shape on the Egyptian border that might eventually result in a new investigative committee. The diplomatic and security situation that arose on the Israeli-Egyptian border once the Egypt-Gaza border was flung wide open has apparently not yet penetrated the Israeli consciousness. But it is time to start asking pointed questions about the events of this week … The border with Egypt was breached in a single moment, with no warning. It is impossible to refrain from asking whether any of our decision makers, or any of those who whisper in their ears, foresaw this scenario and prepared for it. When Vice Premier Haim Ramon boasts of the impressive decision-making process that preceded last fall’s military operation in Syria, his words sound bizarre in light of what is happening in the South. While hundreds of thousands of Palestinians are streaming into Egyptian Rafah and Hosni Mubarak is having trouble reestablishing the border, while Hamas has succeeded in ending the siege of Gaza via a well-planned operation and simultaneously won the sympathy of the world, which has forgotten the rain of Qassam rockets on Sderot, Israel is entrenching itself in positions that look outdated. The prime minister speaks about the need to continue the closure on Gaza, and the cabinet voices its ‘disappointment’ with Egypt – as if there were ever any chance that the Egyptians would work to protect Israeli interests along the Philadelphi route instead of thinking first of all of their own interests. The failure of the siege of Gaza, which the government declared only a week ago to be ‘bearing fruit’, and especially the fear that this failure will lead to a conflict with Egypt, requires the government to pull itself together and prove that it has been graced with the ability to solve crises and to lead, not merely to offer endless excuses for its leadership during previous crises. As hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were streaming into Sinai by car and making a mockery of Israel’s policy in Gaza, the prime minister gave a speech at the Herzliya Conference that sounded disconnected from reality. There is little point in extolling the quiet on the northern border when a diplomatic and security crisis for which Israel has no solution is taking place in the South. The Qassam fire is continuing, the policy of sanctions on Gaza has collapsed and Hamas is growing stronger politically, militarily and diplomatically. It is clear to everyone that reestablishing the border along the Philadelphi route will be impossible without its consent…”
The Haaretz editorial is posted here.

This is the second important document needed to understand the current situation at Rafah

This is the second important document needed to understand the current problem at the Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt, which was breached in recent days by up to 700,000 Palestinians on a shopping spree after having been cooped up for months in Gaza (since the Hamas rout of Fatah security forces, actually).

This is the agreement that Condoleeza Rice stayed up all night on her birthday in November 2005 to negotiate. The then-President of the World Bank, James Wolfenson, was also involved (he was the Quartet envoy referred to in this document).

I have not seen any useful analysis of this agreement. Suffice it to say that virtually none of it was ever implemented in practice.

Please note that the memorandum of understanding with the EU about Rafah is not appended, as this document might suggest — and I haven’t found it yet…

Israel-Palestinian Authority agreement on movement and access and Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing

Agreement on Movement and Access

“To promote peaceful economic development and improve the humanitarian situation on the ground, the following agreement has been reached. It represents the commitments of the Government of Israel (GoI) and the Palestinian Authority (PA). Its implementation and further elaboration will be assisted by the Quartet Special Envoy for Disengagement and his staff and/or the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) and his staff.

1. Rafah

The parties have agreed to the attached statement of principles. Rafah will be opened as soon as it is ready to operate at an international standard in accordance with the specifications of this agreement and as soon as the 3rd party is on site, with a target date of November 25.

2. Crossing Points

The parties have agreed that:

The passages will operate continuously. On an urgent basis, Israel will permit the export of all agricultural products from Gaza during this 2005 harvest season.

The new and additional scanner will be installed and fully operational by December 31. At that time, the number of export trucks per day to be processed through Karni will reach 150, and 400 by end-2006. A common management system will be adopted by both parties.

In addition to the number of trucks above, Israel will permit export of agricultural produce from Gaza and will facilitate its speedy exit and onward movement so that quality and freshness can be maintained. Israel will ensure the continued opportunity to export.

To enhance operation, the parties agree that:

— When a new generation of x-ray equipment able to scan trailers as well as containers becomes available it will be used. Once it arrives in the country, testing will also be carried out with the assistance of the Quartet Special Envoy.

— The USSC will ensure continuing consultation, with unresolved implementation issues to be discussed as needed with the parties.

— The PA will ensure that the passages will be protected on the Palestinian side of the border and will train and upgrade the management of all crossings to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. The PA will establish, without delay, a unified system of border management.

— The management system that has been developed for Karni should, with suitable local variations, be adapted to the passages at Erez and Kerem Shalom. Israel also undertakes to put in place similar arrangements as appropriate that will make West Bank passages fully operational as soon as possible. A bilateral committee, with participation as needed of the Quartet Special Envoy and/or the USSC, will develop operational procedures for those passages.

3. Link between Gaza and the West Bank

Israel will allow the passage of convoys to facilitate the movements of goods and persons. Specifically:

— Establish bus convoys by December 15.

— Establish truck convoys by January 15.

— Work out detailed implementation arrangements in a bilateral committee of the GoI and PA with participation as needed from the Quartet team and the USSC.

It is understood that security is a prime and continuing concern for Israel and that appropriate arrangements to ensure security will be adopted.

4. Movement within the West Bank

Consistent with Israel’s security needs, to facilitate movement of people and goods within the West Bank and to minimize disruption to Palestinian lives, the ongoing work between Israel and the U.S. to establish an agreed list of obstacles to movement and develop a plan to reduce them to the maximum extent possible will be accelerated so that the work can be completed by December 31.

5. Gaza Seaport

Construction of a seaport can commence. The GoI will undertake to assure donors that it will not interfere with operation of the port. The parties will establish a U.S.-led tripartite committee to develop security and other relevant arrangements for the port prior to its opening. The 3rd party model to be used at Rafah will provide the basis for this work.

6. Airport

The parties agree on the importance of the airport. Discussions will continue on the issues of security arrangements, construction, and operation.


Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing

To be supplemented prior to opening by agreements on security, customs and 3rd party implementation procedures

General

Rafah will be operated by the Palestinian Authority on its side, and Egypt on its side, according to international standards, in accordance with Palestinian law and subject to the terms of this agreement.

Rafah will be opened as soon as it is ready to operate at an international standard in accordance with the specifications of this agreement and as soon as the 3rd party is on site, with a target date of November 25.

Use of the Rafah crossing will be restricted to Palestinian ID card holders and others by exception in agreed categories with prior notification to the GoI and approval of senior PA leadership.

The PA will notify the GoI 48 hours in advance of the crossing of a person in the excepted categories-diplomats, foreign investors, foreign representatives of recognized international organizations and humanitarian cases.

The GoI will respond within 24 hours with any objections and will include the reasons for the objections;

The PA will notify the GoI of their decision within 24 hours and will include the reasons for their decision;

The 3rd party will ensure the proper procedures are followed and will advise both sides of any information in its possession pertaining to the people applying to cross under these exceptions.

These procedures will remain in place for a period of 12 months, unless the 3rd party delivers a negative evaluation of the PA running the Rafah crossing. This evaluation will be done in close coordination with both sides and will give due consideration to the opinion of both sides.

Rafah will also be used for export of goods to Egypt.

Objective criteria for the inspection of cars will be established by consensus. The criteria are as follows:

Search equipment will be installed, including

— Black lights

— Power tools and a compressor for the tools

— Technology to be agreed, possibly including sonic imagery, gamma detection (full vehicle or hand held), and/or millimetre wave imagery

— Mirrors and bore scope equipment to search hard to reach places

Personnel will be trained to search vehicles and on the use of this equipment by the 3rd party to international standards

Cameras will be installed to monitor the search process

The 3rd party will evaluate the capacity of the PA to inspect cars according to these criteria and to international standards. Once the PA develops the capacity to inspect cars to the satisfaction of the 3rd party, cars will be allowed to pass through Rafah. Until that time, cars will pass through on an exceptional basis, subject to specifications agreed in the security protocol.

Rafah will be the only crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt (with the exception of Kerem Shalom for the agreed period).

The PA will establish clear operating procedures.

Until Rafah is operational, the PA will open Rafah crossing on an ad hoc basis for religious pilgrims, medical patients, and others, in coordination with General Gilad’s office on the Israeli side.

Israel will provide the PA with all information needed to update the Palestinian population registry, including all information on Palestinian ID card holders who are currently outside the country.

A liaison office, led by the 3rd party, will receive real-time video and data feed of the activities at Rafah and will meet regularly to review implementation of this agreement, resolve any disputes arising from this agreement, and perform other tasks specified in this agreement.

Security

The PA will act to prevent the movement of weapons and explosives at the Rafah crossing.

The PA will establish baggage limits for each passenger as part of the procedures. Limits will be the same as currently applied by the GoI; very frequent travellers (suitcase policy) to be agreed.

Travellers, including returning residents, may use the crossing point to bring in personal effects as defined in Rule 1(e) to Heading 7 of the Annex to the prevailing Customs Tariff. Any other personal belongings or other goods shall be cleared at the Kerem Shalom crossing point.

The PA will provide the 3rd party a list of names of the workers at Rafah crossing which will be shared with the Israelis. The PA will take the Israelis concerns into account.

Security services from Israel, PA, the U.S., and Egypt will continue to coordinate on security issues and will participate in the security working group.

On a case by case basis, the PA will consider information on persons of concern provided by the GoI. The PA will consult with the GoI and the 3rd party prior to the PA making a decision to prohibit travel or not. During this consultation, which will not take more than six hours, the person in question will not be permitted to cross.

Customs

GoI and PA will continue to apply the Paris Protocol of 29 April 1994.

Rafah will be operated according to international standards and rules and the Paris Protocol.

GoI and PA agree on widest possible co-operation and information sharing.

GoI and PA will co-operate on training issues.

GoI and PA customs will hold regular meetings to which the GoE will be invited as appropriate.

Kerem Shalom

PA customs officials will clear incoming cargo at Kerem Shalom under the supervision of Israeli customs agents.

Both sides will discuss operating procedures at a later stage.

Operations at Kerem Shalom will provide training and capacity building to PA customs staff.

The 3rd party will review the PA’s customs capacity in 12 months and make a recommendation to both sides for a joint decision regarding future arrangements. In the event of a disagreement, the U.S., in consultation with the GoI, the PA, and the 3rd party, will resolve the issue expeditiously.

Third party

The 3rd party will have the authority to ensure that the PA complies with all applicable rules and regulations concerning the Rafah crossing point and the terms of this agreement. In case of non-compliance the 3rd party has the authority to order the re-examination and reassessment of any passenger, luggage, vehicle or goods. While the request is being processed, the person, luggage, vehicle or cargo in question will not be allowed to leave the premises of the Rafah crossing point.

The 3rd party will assist the PA to build capacity — training, equipment and technical assistance — on border management and customs.

Details of the 3rd party’s role are specified in the attached memorandum of understanding.

The 3rd party will be the European Union”.

The text of this agreement – but minus the supposedly attached memorandum of understanding – is posted
here.

One of the best and most important anaylses of the Israel-Gaza border

Published just after Israel’s “disengagement” from Gaza that was completed in September 2005, I found this analysis by Israeli Brigadier-General Michael Herzog, now the secretary in the Israeli Ministry of Defense to Minister Ehud Barak, to be one of the most interesting and important available. At the time it was written, Brig-Gen Herzog was a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Here are some excerpts from Herzog’s analysis, entitled, “A New Reality on the Egypt-Gaza Border (Part II): Analysis of the New Israel-Egypt Agreement“:
“The September 1 Egypt-Israel agreement regarding the deployment of new Egyptian forces along the Egyptian border with Gaza (the Agreed Arrangements) represents a shared Israeli-Egyptian interest in preventing the militarization and radicalization of Gaza following Israeli disengagement. For the first time, Israel is relinquishing its control over part of the external perimeter of the Palestinian areas, handing responsibility to a third party. Success or failure will bear important consequences for both Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-Palestinian relations.

Israeli considerations. When Israel decided to leave Gaza, the Israeli defense establishment argued against departure from the Philadelphia Corridor, the narrow stretch of land along Gaza’s Egyptian border where Israel fought the smuggling of weapons into Gaza. The concern was over the militarization of Gaza; without Israeli soldiers guarding the border, it was feared that more and new weapons systems, including antiaircraft missiles and improved rockets, could escalate the danger to Israel. No other party, it was argued, can effectively substitute for Israel’s motivation and capability in curbing smuggling. Ultimately, other considerations prevailed. It was clear that with continued Israeli presence, the Philadelphia Corridor would perpetuate a major source of Israeli-Palestinian friction, destabilizing the postdisengagement situation and endangering the isolated Israeli forces left behind. But perhaps the weightiest consideration was the desire to be able to claim that Israel no longer bears responsibility for Gaza, which required a complete withdrawal of forces. Egypt appeared the best available substitute, since it bears formal responsibility and possesses the best tools to stem the flow of arms from its soil.

Egyptian considerations. Egypt moved to assume a more active role in the Israeli-Palestinian scene out of concern lest the void created by Israeli disengagement and the weakness of new Palestinian leadership be filled by destabilizing Islamist forces. Such a development could rebound on Egypt itself, which has its own share of Islamist challenges. Cairo also wanted to prove its indispensability to Israeli-Palestinian conflict management so as to fend off U.S. pressures to democratize. These considerations prompted Egypt to sponsor the Israeli-Palestinian summit at Sharm al-Shaykh and the Palestinian Authority (PA)-Hamas ceasefire in spring 2005, and to begin training Palestinian security forces.

Demilitarization of Sinai. In the course of negotiations, Egyptian negotiators tried to frame the agreement as a first phase to the eventual deployment of several thousand Egyptian troops along the entire Israel-Egypt border south of the Gaza-Egypt border. That demand raised Israeli concerns — and added fuel to a heated public debate over the agreement — lest the Egyptians were to undo the demilitarization of Sinai as established by the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. These concerns were met by defining the agreement as subject to the peace treaty and giving it the appearance of a procedural agreement between militaries. The Agreed Arrangements detail permitted Egyptian forces and equipment, keeping them light in nature; specify prohibitions on anything that may serve military purposes; and involve the existing Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai (MFO) as monitors of implementation. The agreement also grants Israel a veto over any further Egyptian deployment along the joint border. It should be noted that Cairo has always been careful not to fundamentally breach the military annex of the peace treaty.
…
Crossings. The precedent created by Israel relinquishing its control over part of the PA’s external perimeter, opened the wider question of who should control the PA’s remaining external perimeter — including airspace as well as land and maritime frontiers. In the Agreed Arrangements, Egypt gave de facto recognition to Israeli control of the sea off the Gaza coast. At odds are the PA’s political desire to control its own borders, free from any Israeli presence, and Israel’s security concern to avert a breach that would be used to build the terror infrastructure and fuel its use against Israel. Topping the list of concerns is the Rafah crossing in the middle of the Philadelphia Corridor. When Israel left the corridor, the crossing was closed for a scheduled six-month reconstruction, and the traffic of people and goods across the border was redirected to Israeli-controlled passages south of Philadelphia, including a new one under construction at Kerem Shalom, where Gaza, Israel, and Egypt meet. Israel has indicated that it is willing to contemplate the future use of the reconstructed Rafah crossing for the movement of people in both directions, with international monitoring on the ground and remote photographic monitoring by Israel. Working out a detailed agreement on the inspection of people and goods will prove challenging to the parties concerned. Israel will insist on installing a security regime that can be relied upon not only to monitor terrorists and weapons but also to enforce denials of entry, make arrests, and confiscate prohibited goods. If finalized and implemented, it will be the first time Israel will have allowed a third party to shoulder the security responsibility at a border crossing. [n.b., this remark assumes that Gaza is under Israeli control, otherwise, how could Israel regard Rafah as its border crossing?] An agreed solution for Rafah may help open the way to alternative security regimes at other crossings, including land passages, the Palestinian international airport in Gaza, and a future Palestinian seaport.

What if Egypt fails to live up to its commitments under the agreement? After the Israeli departure on September 12, chaos erupted along the Egypt-Gaza border. Vast quantities of arms were smuggled into Gaza; on September 21 it is still not clear that the border has been effectively resealed, although both Egypt and the PA appear committed to sealing it. From the legal, political, and military points of view, it will be highly problematic for Israel to unilaterally abrogate the agreement with Egypt and return its forces to the Philadelphia Corridor. It is more likely that a porous border will result in a toughened Israeli stance regarding the opening and control of the other border crossings under discussion and making it harder for people and goods to enter Israel from Gaza. Here, the security concerns will be compounded by economic ones�the collapse of the Israel-PA unified customs regime long applied along the PA’s borders will require the establishment of a new independent Israeli customs regime along the Israel-Gaza border”.

This analysis by IDF Brig. Gen. Michael Herzog is posted here.

U.S. State Dept Spokesperson – Egypt should decide how to proceed with Gaza border

Nothing might seem more normal: U.S. State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack told journalists at his daily briefing in Washington today that “We are confident that the Egyptians are capable of handling their own sovereign responsibilities along the border…From our perspective, up to the Egyptians to determine how they would like to proceed. They’re a sovereign nation and this is their border with Gaza and ultimately it’s their responsibility”.

Here is a map from the BBC World Service website:

Egypt's border with Gaza - heavily breached along red dotted line

The airport down in the lower corner, labeled “not is use”, has been destroyed once by Israeli forces, rebuilt, then damaged again so badly by Israel that it is now unusable.

Until now, Israel did not like at all the idea that Egypt alone should supervise its border with Gaza. Remember the very recent affair of the Palestinian pilgrims going to Mecca? Then coming back?

The 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel specifies that all of the Sinai, which Israel returned only gradually to Egypt in three stages ending in 1982, should be demilitarized. Only Egyptian “border police” are allowed there, not Egyptian military forces, and only in specified numbers.

Israel insisted on supervising everything that went on at that border, to the extent that U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice stayed up all night on her birthday in November 2005 to work out an agreement on the Rafah crossing — it was to be operated by European Union personnel, who would be watched on camera by Israeli security personnel, in real time, not on delayed video. [See later post above]

In 2005, an increase in the number of Egyptian border police was agreed, and now up to 750 are allowed on the border.

Now, these remarks from the U.S. State Department spokesperson on Thursday suggest that the U.S. is open to a renegotiation of that arrangement.

And, Israel’s Debka File (which relies on its alleged good security connections to go “beyond” what the regular media are reporting), said on Thursday that “Early Thursday, Jan. 24, American forces and equipment withdrew from the Multi-force Organization base at Al Gura northeast of al Arish. This force monitors Sinai’s demilitarization under a key clause of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. Washington and Cairo are discussing evacuating the entire base and its 400 multinational personnel*. The Egyptian high command was informed that Hamas had begun moving some of its elite units to its new stronghold. [it is not clear what this means — but it certainly does not mean to this MFO base at al-Gura]

*Helena Cobban comments in her blog, here, that: “If true — and I have no reason to doubt that it is — then this is huge. The Multi-National Force and Observers (MFO) was created in 1979 as a US-led ‘coalition of the willing’ force tasked with monitoring implementation of the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. If the force is now being redeployed (=withdrawn) from the area bordering Gaza, that is already a major development. But now, in addition, Egypt and Washington are discussing evacuating the El-Gorah base, which is one of the MFO’s two main operating bases? The political crisis in Cairo provoked by yesterday’s bust-out of Palestinians from Gaza into Sinai seems to be much deeper than I had previously thought”.

Debka File continues: “Egyptian forces are not capable of contending with this strength or the hundreds of thousands of Gazan on the move between Gaza and Sinai since Hamas blew up the concrete border fence Tuesday. [n.b., If this is true, it is in part of course because the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty imposes limitations on Egyptian military moves in the Sinai.] Israeli officials continue to treat the crisis as a problem for Egypt to address, rather than emanating from Israel’s failure to pre-empt Hamas’ well-laid plan with timely and appropriate military action. Senior military sources told DEBKAfile that Hamas’ strategic feat is irreversible. By demolishing the 10-km concrete barrier dividing the Gaza Strip from Egyptian Sinai, Hamas has acquired a new stronghold outside Israel’s military reach while their missiles and guns retain access to Israeli targets from the Gaza Strip”. This analysis was posted on 24 January here.

Meanwhile, Israel has issued a travel alert for Israeli tourists in the Sinai to return home immediately, and it has closed Road 10 (is this the Philadelphi Road when it reaches the Gaza Strip?)…

This came after a day in which various Israeli military sources said they wanted Egypt to take over full responsibility for Gaza — Israel wants to give Gaza away to Egypt, to renew the situation as it was between 1948 and 1967.

But Egypt said no, thanks. Or, was it: No Way! Actually, however, it might be able to persuade Egypt…

Collective punishment — "God help all of us" if the world is ready to accept it

Haaretz columnist Bradley Burston wrote today that “The world does not think highly enough of Hamas to hold it accountable for the actions of the gunners who use the launchers produced by Hamas and the rockets produced by Hamas. The world believes that if Israel outguns Hamas with an arsenal that includes the most advanced fighter bombers and even nuclear weapons, the people of Sderot are somehow protected from the rockets that strike them day in and day out, year after agonizing year. The people of Sderot have nothing but miracles to depend on. And even miracles betray them. Because if they are spared from death by one miracle after another, the world cannot be bothered to care about them. Even their fellow Israelis concede that they would do more to defend the people of Sderot, if more of them were being killed – yet another form of collective punishment.

“When Israel cut fuel shipments to Gaza this month, the same defense establishment which had been given weeks and months to plan for the step, found itself taken aback that water and sewage pumps stopped working — not because of Hamas subterfuge or Hamas hyperbole, but because Israel stopped supplying fuel to Palestinian power plants. Many Gazans, non-combatants, were left without water in a public health crisis akin to a natural disaster…

“We practice collective punishment as an intentional tactic, believing it to be more humane than outright invasion and carpet bombing — holding, as we do, to the preposterous hope that after 40 years of failing at it, we will persuade the people of Gaza to bring their own militants to heel. The Palestinians who fire Qassams, meanwhile, see them not as collective punishment but as legitimate self-defense, employed because they have no other alternative. They are wrong. Dead wrong. And so are we.

“Collective punishment is abhorrent. It is morally reprehensible. It is functionally self-defeating. It destroys the moral fiber of those who order it, practice it, countenance it, turn a blind eye to it … We are guilty of it. The Palestinians are guilty no less.

“Crimes against humanity are crimes against humanity. The victims of crimes against humanity never ‘had it coming to them’ as we might persuade ourselves to believe.

“We’re going to have to find some other way to stop Qassams. After an eternity in which both sides resist it, we may have to talk to Hamas, which can actually get the job done. In the meanwhile, it is time to think long and hard about what we gain and what we lose by practicing collective punishment in Gaza.

“The Israeli airwaves have been awash in recent days with learned, intelligent people arguing that no one who has a healthy mind supplies his enemies with the tools and the fuels of war. Their point is understandable. But it assumes that there is logic to this conflict. It assumes that the target of Palestinian anger over collective punishment will be Hamas and not Israel.

“It assumes that the world is ready to change its rotation.

“It also assumes that the world is ready to accept collective punishment. God help us all when that happens.”

Bradley Burston’s column in Haaretz today on collective punishment is published here.

Gideon Levy on killings in Gaza and fear in Sderot

Gideon Levy has written in Haaretz today: “Here we have the yardstick for security success: the number of Palestinians killed. As in the most primeval wars, the heads of the defense establishment are boasting about the number of people Israel has killed. Their job is to ensure protection for the residents of the state. And, as we know, the residents of the “Gaza perimeter” are not receiving this protection. So the death toll has become the measure of their success.

Shin Bet head Yuval Diskin briefed the cabinet last week about the “achievements” of his organization: 810 Palestinians killed during the past two years. His predecessor, Avi Dichter, once appeared before the editorial board of Haaretz and proudly presented a sophisticated slideshow from his laptop computer: a pie chart of Palestinian casualties, in several colors. Last week, the brigade commander in Gaza, Colonel Ron Ashrov, defined the operation in the Zeitun neighborhood as “very successful.” Why? Because his troops killed 19 Palestinians in a single day and further inflamed the conflagration in the South. How depressing, morally and in practical terms, to think that this is the measure of success.

Has the daily mass killing in Gaza improved the security situation? No, it has only made it worse. Has it reduced the number of Qassams? No, it has led to their proliferation. So why are we killing? We need “to do something” and there needs to be “a price tag.” These are hollow cliches. A review of recent newspapers presents a clear picture: As long as the U.S. president was still in the country, Israel refrained from liquidations, and the number of Qassams decreased. When George Bush left, we resumed killing and, as a result, Sderot has faced the most difficult days it has ever known. The burning question that arises is: What are we killing for? Someone must answer this.

…

The continued killing in Gaza is leading nowhere, except for exacerbating the situation in Sderot. It will not weaken the Palestinians’ struggle for freedom and will not bring security for Israel. The yearning for a “large-scale military operation” in Gaza, as described by warmongering generals and commentators, is also infuriating. This operation already started a long time ago – just listen to the death figures of Diskin and his colleagues. We have killed over 800 Palestinians in two years, and it is appalling that some take pride in this. And what have we solved?”

This article by Gideon Levy is published in Haaretz here.

Gaza's power plant powers up – two turbines reach 56 MW by 8 pm – going for 65 MW

Israel sent in about 700,000 liters of the industrial diesel needed to run Gaza’s power plant on Tuesday, and the plant powered up again just after 12:00 noon.

The plant had not been producing electricity since Sunday night at 8 pm, for lack of fuel.

A decision has been made to run two turbines at full load, to produce 65 MW of electricity.   By about 8 pm, the two turbines were operating at 56 MW.

Israeli officials said that the 700,000 were to last for two days.  But, two turbines operating at full load continuously need 720,000 liters.

Palestinians in Gaza demonstrated against the limitations keep on the sanctions imposed by the Israeli military in response to the firing of Qassams, mortars, and other “projectiles” at Israeli territories.

And a massive propaganda campaign is underway to blame Hamas for the crisis in Gaza — which some propagandists even said is faked.

Daniel Levy's post-mortem on Bush visit – a green light for Gaza attack?

Daniel Levy has written an interesting post-mortem of the Bush visit to Israel and the West Bank, and published it on his blog on 18 January: “Accurately or not, the president’s visit to Israel was interpreted as signalling a green light to an Israeli military escalation in the Gaza Strip. That is certainly what has happened in the last days with a Palestinian death toll of at least 25 and a barrage of rockets on the Israeli town of Sderot and neighbouring communities in response. The brakes that exist on a further deterioration in Gaza, and perhaps an extensive Israeli ground operation, are being generated locally out of a concern on both sides that escalation will achieve little. There is no visible Washington foot on that brake, and if anything it hovers closer to the accelerator. While certain Israeli ministers and former senior officials call for a ceasefire with Hamas (an option apparently also favoured by the Hamas leadership), President Bush still inhabits a Game Boy version of the Middle East, divided simply into black and white where you kill the bad guy to advance to the next level. In fact, Bush’s insistence on confronting an undifferentiated green enemy of Islamists continues to miss the nuances that exist in reality, to miss opportunities for new alliances with Islamists against al-Qaida and to undermine the goal of restabilising the region.
…
So, what of the items that were supposed to feature prominently on the president’s agenda: democracy, Iran and an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal? The democracy agenda was discounted in the region long before the president’s visit and will not be taken anymore seriously as a consequence of meetings in UAE with young Arab leaders, in Saudi Arabia with entrepreneurs and in Kuwait with women activists. The Bush administration’s push for freedom has suffered from at least four basic flaws from the get-go. First, it has been obsessively election-centric and ill-attuned to local conditions. Second, it had no sensible, inclusive plan for dealing with the inevitable electoral successes of political Islamists. Third, touting freedom for everyone but denying it to the Palestinians under occupation was (somehow) perceived as hypocritical. And fourth, the Bush team had a special talent for delivering the message in the most patronizing, demeaning and unsympathetic way possible. Add to this list the real life experiences of post-election Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine, and one understands why the neoconservative designers of the policy should be laughed out of town, rather than feted on the op-ed pages of the New York Times (see William Kristol). Oh, and saying nothing about the Israeli imprisonment of 43 members of the Hamas-affiliated Change and Reform party elected to the Palestinian Legislative Council does not make the message sound any more credible.
…
And finally, Israel-Palestine. This is the one area where the president’s visit hinted at a genuine intention to get something done in the coming year. During his trip the president seemed to convince some sceptics of his personal commitment to achieving a two-state solution, and he belatedly accepted some of the logic that links an end of the occupation to progress on other issues in the region, including efforts to marginalise radicalism and build regional alliances.
But even those impressed by the demonstration of political will were left scratching their heads as to whether this US administration has the political skill to constructively engage. The appointment of three different US generals to oversee various aspects of the process suggests that Washington is still competence-challenged, and there are real question marks regarding the depth of American understanding of what the content of a mutually acceptable two-state deal would look like.
Finally, there is the continued self-defeating approach to Hamas. Hussein Agha and Robert Malley outline a way forward in this Middle East triangle of Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and Hamas in today’s Guardian. They describe the need for Fatah and Hamas to reach a new agreement that Israel would not oppose, for Hamas and Israel to achieve a ceasefire and for Abbas and Olmert to negotiate a political deal (and have a mandate to do so from Hamas). ‘Synchronicity is key … . The current mindset, in which each side considers deal-making by the other two to be a mortal threat, could be replaced by one in which all three couplings are viewed as mutually reinforcing … a choreography that minimizes violence and promotes a serious diplomatic process’. Wise advise and advise that the Bush administration would do well to adopt if it is to salvage anything from a Middle East nightmare that it has been so seminal in shaping – or maybe it was all just about oil and arms sales“…

Daniel Levy’s thoughts on the results — or lack of them — from Bush’s recent visit to Israel and the West Bank were posted on 18 January here.

Gaza Power Plant stops operations due to lack of fuel

Gaza‘s power plant has stopped generating electrical power.

Officials at the Gaza power plant confirmed just after 8:00 p.m. operations were powered down for lack of fuel.

The power plant that represented Palestinian aspirations to build the infrastructure of an independent state is no longer generating any electricity at all, after Israel reduced supplies of fuel needed to run the plant to a strict minimum.

Then, a few days shortfall in fuel deliveries last week, and a total cut-off since Thursday, pushed the problem to the limit.

Dr. Kittaneh, head of the Palestine Energy Authority in Ramallah, said that “We do have two days of fuel reserves, but we cannot operate on reserves. This is very harmful to the machines”.

“No”, he explained emphatically, “We cannot get even one more day of operations out of those reserves. We will only operate without load to keep the machines running”.

Assaf, the spokesperson for the Minister of National Infrastruture, Benjamin Ben Eliezer, said on Sunday evening that this matter is now being handled only by the Ministry of Defense.

Maher Najjar of the Gaza Coastal Municipalities Water Utility said over the phone from Gaza on Saturday evening that the situation regarding the power plant is now “scary”.

“The food is cut off, but on that we can be patient for a few days”, he said, “but getting fuel to operate the power plant is vital. There is also a shortage of electricity coming directly from Israel as well. That means the water pumping stations and the sewage pumps will fail. There will be sewage flooding for sure. It will be a catastrophe”.

Najjar said on Sunday that his company (Coastal Municipalities Water Utility) had a limited amount of some spare fuel from their supplier, and could keep some wells and sewage pumping stations operating for a couple of days, possibly until Tuesday.

But, he said, some pumps will shut down. “We are updating the fuel situation now, and checking with our area managers, and will prepare a status report, which we will distribute. We’ll do this daily”, Mr. Najjar added.

Gaza’s border crossings were ordered closed tight by Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak on Thursday night, in response to continuous firing of various kinds of “projectiles” from Gaza into Israel, following Israeli ground incursions and air attacks.

There is no way to crush popular resistance to occupation…

An opinion article in YNet today, “Pulverizing Gaza Strip won’t help; Sderot will rest only when Gaza rests”, by Yigal Sarna, says: “How do we try to calm hell? By making it even hotter. Every year we kill hundreds of hell residents, destroy homes and vehicles, and wait for everything to quiet down. This is how it works in Gaza. This is how it fails. We kill 19 people in one day, including the son of a senior figure, and wait for quiet to prevail. And then, a Qassam barrage follows. Just like the Second Lebanon War. The routine is simple: The IDF does not rush to enter the Strip for fear of heavy casualties among our troops. So we deliver hard, non-surgical blows. We kill many from the air, and then we see a change: A sea of Qassams. And then, the brilliant idea of a ground incursion emerges again; the same thing that was carried out at the end of the Second Lebanon war – the 33 casualties of the last, needless hours. A ground incursion into Gaza is like a magic cure for baldness around here: Everyone counts on it, but nobody believes in it. There is no way to crush popular resistance to occupation or to a foreign army – I heard this message from 100 Shin Bet officials in the years I have been visiting these military training zones. There is no military way, and still, even Olmert, the sly attorney who lost his faith in the army and who even dared complain about the army’s power to drag all of us in, tries the same military moves time and again. He is being dragged by the IDF, and by Ehud Barak, who is his defense minister but also a political rival who wishes to see the PM ousted. This is such a dangerous, lethal combination…” The article in YNet is posted here.