The Times of Israel [a new English-language internet publication] said they obtained it on Sunday 15 April, and they published it the same day — in English — here.

An Arabic-language text was leaked to Haaretz correspondent Barak Ravid some two weeks earlier. Ravid wrote about it on 4 April, and also Tweeted each of the four pages of the Arabic text, as we reported on our sister blog, www.un-truth.com, here.

THE LETTER [Draft]:

Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu
State of Israel

H.E. Prime Minister Netanyahu:

In 1993, the Palestine Liberation Organization signed the Declaration of Principles (The Oslo Accords) and exchanged letters of mutual recognition with the Government of Israel.

The Declaration of Principles defined its aim as the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 which would begin with a transitional period, and culminate with negotiations on the all final status issues including Jerusalem, borders, settlements, refugees, water, security, relations with neighboring countries, and other matters of mutual interest. Over the years, we included end of the conflict and claims, and the release of prisoners and detainees to these final status issues. May 1999 was set as the date by which negotiations on all final status issues would be completed and a comprehensive peace agreement between the two sides would be reached.

The PLO and the State of Israel subsequently signed additional agreements including the Interim Agreement in 1995, the Wye River Agreement in 1998, the Hebron Protocol of 1998, and the Sharm Sheikh Agreement in 1999. We also engaged in negotiations on final status issues during the Camp David talks in 2000, the Annapolis talks between 2007-2008, and talks conducted in Washington D.C., Sharm Sheikh and West-Jerusalem in September 2010. Most recently, in January 2012, I dispatched a delegation to Amman, Jordan for exploratory talks in furtherance of the Quartet Statement of 23 September 2011.

In the midst of these agreements and bilateral talks, the Arab states presented the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, and the Quartet for Middle East Peace presented its Road Map plan of 2003. Signed agreements, international law, and UN Resolutions, all recognize that peace will only be realized upon the end of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land that began in 1967. Until such time, Article 7 of the Interim Agreement stipulated that both parties, Israel and the PLO, shall not take any steps that would prejudice final status negotiations.

A fundamental obligation placed on Israel under international law and the quartet’s Road Map, was that it freeze all settlement activity, including natural growth. In a letter sent by former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres to Norwegian foreign Minister Holst in 1993, Israel also committed itself to maintain the educational, economic, social, and cultural institutions in East Jerusalem, conserve the Christian and Moslem holy places, preserve Palestinian interests in East Jerusalem, and not to hinder their development.

Mr. Prime Minister,

As a leaders , both of us have to face skepticism and opposition. In the quest of peace we have to help each other. We know that violence and terror whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis is not the way. I know that it erodes both of our public’s trust in peace. Therefore, I reiterate our full commitment to a policy of zero tolerance against violence. At the same token, I expect your understanding that settlement building is eroding the Palestinian trust in your commitment to reconciliation and the idea of the two states solution. The logic is simple: If you support the establishment of a Palestinian state, why do you build on its territory?.

Mr. Prime Minister,

Among the most critical components of the signed agreements between the PLO and Israel is the recognition that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip constitute a single territorial unit, the integrity of which must be preserved until a final status agreement is reached. As such it is subject to one law and one authority. In recognition of this, I have been determined to end the division of my people through national reconciliation, in accordance with my political program which respects signed agreements, recognizes the State of Israel, and renounces violence. With regret, the Government of Israel has chosen to take a position diametrically opposed to Palestinian national reconciliation.
Aside from this, we continue to honor all our obligations, including the reactivation of the trilateral anti- incitement committee

Mr. Prime Minister,

We have responded in good faith to the efforts exerted by President Obama, and the Quartet in furtherance of peace, and we have welcomed the courageous Jordanian initiative aimed at putting the peace process on the right track, including through the submission of comprehensive positions on territory and security by the parties.

The Palestinian delegation submitted our proposals on these two final status issues and we reiterated our commitments and obligations. We asked your government to also submit comprehensive proposals on territory, security, and to commit to a settlement freeze, and release prisoners. These were not preconditions but Israeli obligations. To our deep regret, none of these commitments were honored.

Mr. Prime Minister

Our historic Peace Proposal is still waiting for an answer from Israel.
• We agreed to establish the State of Palestine on only 22% of the territory of historical Palestine-on all the Palestinian Territory occupied by Israel in 1967.
• The establishment of independent Palestinian State that can live side-by-side with the State of Israel in peace and security on the borders of 1967 with mutually agreed swaps equal in size and value.
• Security will be guaranteed by a third party accepted by both, to be deployed on the Palestinian side.
• A just and agreed resolution for the refugees’ problem as specified in the Arab Peace Initiative.
• Jerusalem will serve as a capital of two States. East Jerusalem capital of Palestine. West Jerusalem capital of Israel. Jerusalem as an open city can be the symbol of peace.

Mr. Prime Minister,

Twenty years ago, we concluded with Israel an agreement under international auspices which was intended to take the Palestinian people from occupation to independence. Now, as a result of actions taken by successive Israeli governments, the Palestinian National Authority no longer has any authority, and no meaningful jurisdiction in the political, economic, social, territorial and security spheres. In other words, the P.A. lost its reason d’être…

The DRAFT Abbas letter continues:
“In recognition of the above and in furtherance of the peace process and the agreements we signed with Israel, which were premised on international legitimacy, international law, and internationally-recognized terms of reference, we call on the Government of Israel to do the following:

1- Accept the two-state solution on the 1967 borders with possible minor and mutually agreed upon land swaps of equal size and value;
2- Stop all settlement activities, including in East Jerusalem;
3- Release all prisoners, in particular those imprisoned prior to the end of 1994; and
4- Revoke all decisions taken since 2000 which undermine agreements signed between Israel and the PLO.

Should the Government of Israel refuse to honor these above-referenced obligations, we will seek the full and complete implementation of international law as it pertains to the powers and responsibilities of Israel as occupying power in all of the occupied Palestinian territory.
For the Palestinian Authority—now stripped of all meaningful authority—cannot continue to honor agreements while Israel refuses to even acknowledge its commitments. The P.A. is no longer as was agreed and this situation cannot continue.

Mr. Prime Minister

I strongly believe that both our peoples yearn for peace. As leaders, it’s our historic task to make it happen. Let’s not fail our peoples.

Sincerely Yours

Mahmoud Abbas

Chairman of the P.L.O Executive Committee
President of the Palestinian National Authority

The Quartet Plan was presented to stop the P.L.O. from pursuing their “UN bid”, or pressing it for a vote, because Israel was terribly upset, and the U.S. threatened to use their veto power to block it in the UN Security Council.

At the first 3-month mark, the two parties were to have met, and they were to have exchanged ideas on what the borders for a two-state solution should look like, and on security arrangements.

So, what has happened?

In December, the Palestinians let it be known that if Israel doesn’t present its idea of borders for a two-state solution by this date, the “hudna” or “truce would be over, and the Palestinians would again unleash all efforts for international recognition and admission to the international organization.

In a calm and rather leisurely reaction, the U.S. State Department said a few days later that the three-month marker was not a rigid or fixed “deadline” … and urged efforts to continue to bring the parties back to the table for direct negotiations.

[Only the Palestinians were refusing, saying it would be useless, mainly because Israeli settlement-building activities continued, while Israeli officials said to anyone who would listen that they were ready for direct talks, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu even repeated his offer to go anywhere, almost anytime -- even to Ramallah...]

Then, King Abdullah II of Jordan flew by helicopter over the Israeli-controlled West Bank and landed in the refurbished helicopter pad at Ramallah Presidential Muqata’a for a meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas — a day before Abbas himself was due to travel through Jordan, on his way to another session of Palestinian reconciliation talks with Hamas officials in Cairo… Little was revealed publicly about that meeting, and some diplomatic sources suggested that the real purpose was that Abdullah needed help and had panicked, and was really asking Mahmoud Abbas for help .

What is more significant is that U.S. State Department envoy David Hale, who had met Abbas the evening before, was back in Jerusalem to meet Israeli PM Netanyahu just before Abdullah II landed in Ramallah. Then, Hale drove overland to Amman, and met Abdallah II back in Amman that evening.

Not long afterwards, Jordan announced that it would be hosting talks between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in Amman — which would include direct meetings for the first time since September 2010. Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh announced that further contacts would be held — but not announced.

The U.S. Secretary of State then announced the date of the second meeting, in early January…

There was criticism from different Palestinian political groupings, from Hamas to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP], and Palestinian “youth groups” organized a couple of demonstrations outside the Muqata’a to protest.

A total of five meetings were held in Amman, prior to today’s deadline.

The Palestinians presented their maps and border proposals in an early meeting.

It was not until the last meeting of negotiators [the P.L.O.'s Saeb Erekat, and Israel's Yitzhak Molcho] that the Israeli delegation screeched up to the meeting, just hours before the deadline, with a kind of power-point presentation about its general ideas — but reportedly without any very specific indications of what Israel thought the borders for a two-state solution should be… and not much indication about security, either.

UPDATE: AP reported on Friday 27 January, here, that:

“Israel is proposing to essentially turn its West Bank separation barrier into the border with a future state of Palestine, two Palestinian officials said Friday, based on their interpretation of principles Israel presented in talks this week. The officials said Israeli envoy Yitzak Molcho told his Palestinian counterpart that Israel wants to keep east Jerusalem and consolidate Jewish settlements behind the separation barrier, which slices close to 10 percent off the West Bank. They spoke on condition of anonymity, citing strict no-leaks rules by Jordanian mediators … Israel has confirmed that it presented principles this week for drawing a border with a Palestinian state. But the politically charged nature of the talks — even though they were held at a relatively low level, below that of Cabinet ministers — was reflected in the guarded refusal by any top official to discuss details. An Israeli government official said that as far as he knew, the information was incorrect, but declined to elaborate or go on the record, citing Jordan’s demand for discretion. Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor, one of the closest Cabinet ministers to Netanyahu, said he has been supporting such an offer for months, and that Israel should concentrate on preserving the large West Bank settlement blocs, close to the pre-1967 border. But he could not confirm whether the offer was in fact made. ‘I do not know if (Molcho) said these words exactly, but it would be great’, Meridor told The Associated Press … Israel started building the barrier in 2002, in the midst of a Palestinian uprising that included scores of deadly attacks by Palestinian militants who crossed from the West Bank into Israel and blew themselves up among civilians … However, it was routed in a way that raised questions about Israel’s claim that it was a temporary security measure — weaving through the West Bank, looping wide around some settlements to leave room for expansion, and looking very much like a border a future Israeli government might argue for. The Palestinians condemned it from the start as a land grab. The Palestinian officials also said that Molcho portrayed the Jordan Valley, which makes up about one-fourth of the West Bank and borders Jordan, as a strategic Israeli security asset. However, that wording suggests less than a demand for firm territorial control. Netanyahu has said he wants a continued Israeli presence on the eastern border of a future Palestinian state as part of any peace deal. Netanyahu has long argued Israel needs the area as a security buffer — protection against possible attack from the east. The 1994 peace treaty with Jordan eased this concern — but the Arab Spring has given it new life: although it is almost never discussed by officials, mindful of riling Jordan, many in Israel ponder a nightmare scenario in which the Jordanian monarchy falls to Israel’s enemies, who then pour weapons and militants into the West Bank, reaching within miles (kilometers) from its major cities. A senior Israeli military official said last week the Israeli army had to consider in its planning the possibility of heightened threats from east of the West Bank. Israeli officials have said any presence in the Jordan Valley could be reviewed over time … The Palestinians argue that the period set aside for the contacts ended Thursday, or three months after the Quartet issued its marching orders. Israel says the intention was to have three months of talks, and so wants meetings to continue”.

FURTHER UPDATE: Ethan Bronner’s report in the NYTimes later on Friday here, contains essentially the same description of the two different views on the Quartet’s 26 January “deadline”:

“The Palestinian view is that the terms of the talks — laid out last fall by the European Union, Russia, the United Nations and the United States — required both sides to present their approach to borders and security by this week. The Israelis say the clock began ticking only when the two sides actually sat down this month and the deadline is therefore in April … ”

The NYTimes account added:

“A Palestinian official said the offer ‘effectively abandons international law and the framework we have been focused on for the past 20 years’. Speaking on the condition of anonymity on the subject of the talks, as did Israeli officials, the Palestinian said, ‘If you put it in perspective, it is as if the West Bank were not occupied, just disputed, with both sides having legitimate claims, while the rest of Israel remains outside the dispute’ … The Palestinian official who spoke anonymously added that the Israeli negotiator, Yitzhak Molho, did not provide any written documents or maps in his discussion with the Palestinian negotiator, Saeb Erekat, and did not include Jerusalem or the Jordan Valley in what he discussed. ‘Our starting point is the 1967 borders with minor swaps and theirs is the wall and settlements’, he said, referring to the separation barrier Israel has been building for the past decade along and inside the West Bank.’“In some ways, this is their way of reframing the occupation’ … A Palestinian official said the offer “effectively abandons international law and the framework we have been focused on for the past 20 years.” Speaking on the condition of anonymity on the subject of the talks, as did Israeli officials, the Palestinian said, “If you put it in perspective, it is as if the West Bank were not occupied, just disputed, with both sides having legitimate claims, while the rest of Israel remains outside the dispute … [Meanwhile] An Israeli official defended the offer. ‘The principle we laid out on Wednesday is that the majority of Palestinians should be on the Palestinian side and the majority of Jews on our side’, that official said. ‘These are preliminary discussions. The Palestinians have asked for clarification. We have asked for clarifications from them on some things as well. And we hope that in the coming weeks these talks will continue’.”

Mahmoud Abbas met the Quartet High Representative, Catherine Ashton, in Amman tonight.

It was later announced that the Fatah + the PLO would be meeting to discuss the situation on Sunday + Monday, and that Mahmoud Abbas would ask the Arab League for guidance at a meeting in Cairo on 4 February.

LATER UPDATE: The Los Angeles Times reported here in a story filed from Ramallah on Saturday 28 January [after Abbas met with the Irish Foreign Minister and the Deputy of the Foreign Affairs
Committee of the Japanese Parliament] that:

“Palestinian and Jordanian officials said the talks will be on hold for a week for evaluation and to give Abbas time to consult with Palestinian and Arab officials on whether to continue with them or not. But at two meetings with foreign officials visiting Ramallah to help salvage the talks, Abbas said the negotiations are at a dead end. Abbas told one of his guests that ‘Israeli intransigence and refusal to submit clear proposals on the issues of borders and security as requested by the Quartet [of Middle East peace mediators] have blocked the way to continue with the exploratory talks,” according to the official WAFA news agency’. In the second meeting, Abbas briefed his guest on the latest developments in the peace process, ‘particularly the impasse in the exploratory meetings being held in Amman as a result of Israeli government rejection of the two-state solution and a stop to settlements’, WAFA reported”.

The AP had an interview with Rice to coincide with the publication of her memoir, No Higher Honor, today: “Rice’s account confirms then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s claim that he had laid out a comprehensive proposal for peace during secret meetings with Rice and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas … In the book, Rice recounts a private dinner with Olmert in May 2008 when she said he presented the plan. It contained ways to address the most difficult issues preventing Israel and the Palestinians from agreeing on terms for a separate Palestinian state, she wrote. Olmert proposed a system for shared jurisdiction of Jerusalem and return of a limited number of Palestinians who left their homes in what is now Israel when the Jewish state was created in 1948, Rice wrote. Olmert also would end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and hand over about 94 percent of the territory to the Palestinians for the bulk of their state, she wrote. ‘Concentrate, concentrate’, Rice describes herself as thinking as Olmert spoke. ‘This is unbelievable’.”

The AP story is headlined: “Mideast peace prospects [have] worsened under Obama”.

This AP interview as Condoleezza Rice’s book is published here.

Rice claims, as many media accounts do, that the Obama Administration raised the bar too high by its early adoption of a demand for a settlement freeze after which direct negotiations would resume. This, she [like most media accounts] says, was the main problem that blocked the possibility of resuming direct Israeli-Palestinian talks — which, she implies [backing the Palestinian position on this point] should have resumed at the point they were broken off.

Now, she said, the lack of talks is the the main factor in the dangerous increase in tension in the region.

The Washington Post also published this AP story, which quoted Rice as saying: “I do think focusing on settlements in that particular way was a mistake … The parties then were able to have a reason not to sit down … and they’re running out of time … When they’re not talking, they’re sliding backward”.

This is posted here.

The documents were posted a short while ago by Colum Lynch, correspondent at UNHQ/NY, on the Foreign Policy website, here.

It is notable that Mahmoud Abbas signed the letter as President of the State of Palestine, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

This is an improved formulation over the earlier version (which former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon included in Israel’s 14 reservations to the U.S.-backed Road Map in 2003) of requiring acceptance of a “Jewish State”.

However, there is no real clarity about what, exactly, that would mean. Palestinians fear it is formula to withdraw rights and citizenship from the one million or so (20-25% of Israel’s population) who are Palestinian Arabs, and that it also means agreement acquiescence in wiping out any and all residual claims of some 4 or 5 million Palestinian refugees and their descendants living in a diaspora around the world.

So far, it is a dialog of the deaf.

Palestinians of almost all political views react with outrage, anger… and smoldering fury.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) is reported to have just said, in New York, that “Israel can call itself… the Jewish-Zionist Empire”, if it wants. This is reported on YNet, here.

Now, according to a report today in the Jerusalem Post, Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon caused a spat with Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad at a periodic meeting of major donors at UNHQ in New York. According to the JPost’version, “Ayalon refused to approve a summary of the meeting which said ‘two states’ but did not include the words ‘two states for two peoples’ … What I say is that if the Palestinians are not willing to talk about two states for two peoples, let alone a Jewish state for Israel, then there’s nothing to talk about’, Ayalon told the Post in a telephone interview. ‘And also, I said if the Palestinians mean, at the end of the process, to have one Palestinian state and one bi-national state, this will not happen … I also said that I don’t need the Palestinians to say Israel is a Jewish state in Hebrew. I need them to say it in Arabic to their own people’.” This JPost report is published here.

So, what does that mean, exactly? Each state should have only one people? You can see where this is leading… it’s confirming the worst fears of the Palestinians, of course. What I have written, in the past, in several places, is that the Palestinians have already accepted Israel as a Jewish State when Yasser Arafat issued the Declaration of Independence of the
Palestinian State in November 1988, then more explicitly (at U.S. insistence) in December 1988 — which explicitly accepts
the UN General Assembly resolution 181 of 29 November 1947, partitioning the British mandate of Palestine into two states, one Arab and one Jewish.

The Palestinians seem to have forgotten…

Earlier, according to the same YNet report, Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu “told the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations that the recognition would be a central part of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. ‘Just say it’, Netanyahu called on Abbas. ‘Say yes to a Jewish state’. The prime minister explained that he was insisting on this because ‘this is a move the Palestinians have refused to make for 62 years. Its significance is Palestinian recognition of the right of the Jewish people to self-definition in their historic homeland. I recognized the Palestinians’ right to self-definition, so they must do the same for the Jewish people’.”

In an interview with Ma’an News agency, also according to this YNet report, Abbas reportedly said that “if Israel wants negotiations in which the Palestinians recognize it, then it must also recognize a Palestinian state”.

By coincidence, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was asked about this whole matter in an interview for Palestine TV conducted by Maher Shalabi (who did the extraordinarily embarassing “The Cedar and the Olive Tree” program in refugee camps in Lebanon recently, in which he grandly handed out $100 U.S. dollar bills after asking stupid questions like, “What is the capitol of Palestine?”).

Here is an excerpt:
” (Maher Shalabi of Palestine TV) QUESTION: I mean, when you talk about Jewish state –

SECRETARY CLINTON: “Yes”.

QUESTION: — don’t you think you’re imposing the outcome of the negotiation and many times, you’re saying, “We want to impose the outcome”?

SECRETARY CLINTON: “Well, of course, that, to me, is a fact, that if you go back and look at the original UN documents, and even if you look at some of the PLO documents over the last many years, everyone recognizes that Israel is a homeland for Jewish people. Palestinians have the right to work toward a homeland for themselves. And I don’t think that takes anything away from either side in saying that”. The full transcript of this interview is available on the State Department website, here.

Why do people wait so long to say these things?

What would have happened if he had said it loudly, publicly, insistently, repetitiously, at the time?

In the story, Sofer reported that “Prime Minister Ehud Olmert attempted to clarify Thursday alleged promises he had made in a so-called ‘final offer’ to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in September 2008, which included the eviction of tens of thousands of settlers and territorial concessions in Jerusalem. ‘There was one point when I put things on the table and offered Abbas something that had never been offered and dealt with the crux of the problem, with the most sensitive issues that touch the most exposed nerves and historical obstacles’, Olmert said during a Thursday conference in Herzliya. ‘I told him – “let’s sign”. It was half a year ago and I’m still waiting’, he said. Senior officials said that a meeting of the leaders in the Prime Minister’s resident in Jerusalem involved a ‘final offer to end the conflict’. The offer involved a future border between a possible Palestinian state to Israel, involving the eviction of the more than 60,000 settlers living beyond the security barrier in the West Bank – the proposed new border between the two entities. The offer involved a return of 93% of the West Bank, leaving in Israel the large population centers, such as Ariel and Elkanah in the north, Maaleh Adumim in the center, and Jerusalem and Gush Etzion in the south. Regarding Jerusalem itself, Olmert offered to cede over to the Palestinians the peripheral neighborhoods and the refugee camps surrounding the city, such as Kalandia. The holy sites, whose sovereignty is desired by all faiths, would be determined within an international framework, the prime minister said. The plan was also presented to the Americans who, according to the Prime Minister’s Office, supported the plan. They apparently also expressed optimism that the offer would be acceptable to the Palestinians”…

This account was published in full in YNet here.

President Obama “reserves the right to engage in whatever way he deems best, at whatever time he chooses to further American interests. And clearly, that is not limited to any one country. It is a broad statement of our approach. We are engaged ourselves in a vigorous policy analysis of a number of problems and challenges that we face around the world. And we will be, you know, rolling out ideas and plans as we go forward. The President and I thought it was important that we, as quickly as possible, set forth our policies in the Middle East and Afghanistan and Pakistan, because we knew we wanted to reengage vigorously from the very beginning in the Middle East. And, you know, we chose as an envoy someone who – we have great confidence in his ability to do that. And to carry the message from the President, from myself, from our government that, you know, we’re going to be working on a series of short-term objectives with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian situation, but that we remain committed to the long-term objective of a comprehensive peace that provides security in the context of a two-state solution for the Palestinians …

“QUESTION: both you and the President in the wake of the Israeli-Hamas conflict have talked a lot about the plight of Palestinians while recognizing Israel’s right to self-defense, but you’ve put a lot of emphasis on the Palestinian plight. And I was wondering if you think that the Israeli campaign, given the fact that Hamas is still in control of Gaza and still on the ground and not completely decapitated, do you think that that was a counterproductive mission?

“SECRETARY CLINTON: You know, I think we’ve said all we’re going to say about the Israeli-Palestinian situation as we send our envoy out. I think we want to give him the opportunity to listen and bring back his impressions and information. And we are at this moment focused only on the Israel-Palestinian track. And I think it’s important to put the emphasis where it rightly belongs. We have, as I said, some short-term objectives such as a durable ceasefire, which as you know has receded somewhat today because of the offensive action against the IDF along the border. But of course, we’re concerned about the humanitarian suffering. We’re concerned any time innocent civilians, Palestinian or Israeli, are attacked. That’s why we support Israel’s right to self-defense. The rocket barrages, which are getting closer and closer to populated areas, cannot go unanswered. And it’s, you know, regrettable that the Hamas leadership apparently believes that it is in their interest to provoke the right of self-defense instead of building a better future for the people of Gaza. We are supporting the efforts by the Palestinian Authority under President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad to try to support the humanitarian efforts. We will participate with our own contributions. The United States is currently the single largest contributor to Palestinian aid, and we will be adding even more because we believe that it’s important to help those who have been damaged and suffering. But again, this is one of those situations that we’re going to await the report of our envoy. I mean, that’s why we chose Senator Mitchell. We have a lot of confidence in his knowledge of the area and his political ear, so you not only hear what people say but what the meaning behind the words might be. So we’re going to wait and let him report back to us about the way forward…”

He is now the envoy of the new U.S. President Barak Obama, and he is now in the region. His mission: to listen. He will meet Egypt’s President Husni Mubarak on Wednesday, then travel to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. On Thursday he will meet Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in the Muqata’a Presidential Palace — a former British governor’s building, and prison — in Ramallah. (After that, Mitchell will go to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, then to Paris and London).

Obama’s first phone call to a foreign leader — on Wednesday, the day after his inauguration — was to President Abbas in Ramallah. Obama told Abbas that he would be engaged in the search for a peaceful solution to the long-standing conflict here. Obama then called Israeli leaders, and the heads of state in neighboring Jordan and Egypt. Obama named Mitchell as special envoy a day later. At the time, obama said Mitchell’s mission would be “to engage vigorously and consistently in order for us to achieve genuine progress … progress that is concrete”.

Last Friday, three days after his inauguration, Obama urged Israel to open Gaza border crossings to aid and commerce. “Now we must extend a hand of opportunity to those who seek peace — as part of a lasting ceasefire, Gaza’s border crossings should be open to allow the flow of aid and commerce … [And] Relief efforts must be able to reach innocent Palestinians who depend on them”, Obama said. He also called for a border monitoring regime involving the Palestinian Authority and the international community. At the same time, he added, Hamas must however stop firing rockets into Israeli territory.

U.S. State Department spokesperson Robert Wood told journalists Monday that “Special envoy Mitchell will work to consolidate the cease-fire in Gaza, establish an effective anti-smuggling and interdiction regime to prevent the rearming of Hamas, facilitate the re-opening of border crossings, and development of an effective response to the immediate humanitarian needs of the Palestinians in Gaza and eventual reconstruction and re-invigorate the peace process”.

Wood indicated that Mitchell will be accompanied by an inter-agency team of Middle East specialists, and will start with an effort to shore up the current Gaza truce. But, Mitchell will not have contacts with Hamas, Wood said.

UPDATE: Ahmad Yousef, a top aide to Ismail Haniyah, received visiting journalists in Gaza in the garden of his house near the border with Egypt, said that “We would like him [Mitchell] to listen to us and to the Hamas vision, what Hamas expects from this American administration … We expect fairness and objectivity and even-handedness when they handle this conflict”, according to the Financial Times. The Christian Science Monitor, whose correspondent said that Yousef was a foreign policy adviser to Hamas leader in Gaza Ismail Haniyeh, reported that he said in the same briefing to visiting journalists: “The Americans and Europeans were mistaken to boycott Hamas from the start … I expected Obama to say that he will go and talk to everybody … We’d like to see America as impartial, not just seeing Hamas as a terrorist group … The people chose Hamas [in January 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council], and America and the rest of the world should respect that”.

Yousef was repeating a position staked out by Khalid Mash’al, head of Hamas’ political bureau, in a televised speech from Damascus last Wednesday, when he called the international community to deal with Hamas. “For three years they have been trying to get rid of us, including through a blockade. Now it is time to start talking to Hamas, a force whose legitimacy was reinforced in the recent war,” he said. This was reported by Ma’an News Agency here.

Gershon Baskin, co-chairman of IPCRI, the Israel-Palestinian Center for Research and Information, explained a bit about Mitchell’s previous involvement here in an opinion peace published in The Jerusalem Post on Monday (26 January): “Mitchell is not new to the region or to serving as an official mediator of conflicts for an American president. Mitchell’s last attempt at mediating between Israel and Palestine began in the end of October 2000 following the outbreak of the second intifada. The Mitchell report which investigated the reasons behind the intifada and what steps should be taken to revert back to a non-violent peace process was published in May 2001, some eight months after the violence erupted and three months after Ariel Sharon was sitting in the Prime Minister’s office. By that time (beginning in February 2001), Hamas and other terror groups had begun the barrage of suicide attacks inside of Israel and the mantra of ‘no partner for peace’ was heard on both sides of the green line. The Mitchell report concluded that: ‘we have no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the PA to initiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity; or to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the Government of Israel to respond with lethal force. However, there is also no evidence on which to conclude that the PA made a consistent effort to contain the demonstrations and control the violence once it began; or that the Government of Israel made a consistent effort to use non-lethal means to control demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians. Amid rising anger, fear, and mistrust, each side assumed the worst about the other and acted accordingly’.”

Baskin also wrote that “Much has happened since the time of Mitchell’s last assignment here. When Mitchell begins his new assignment he will be backed by a different approach in Washington . General Jim Jones as National Security Advisor has already developed his own plan (under President Bush) for a new security concept in the region. Reports have indicated that the heart of Jones’ plan is increased international involvement including the introduction of international forces on the ground in the West Bank and probably in Gaza as well. In his many military assignments Jones was never based in the Middle East, but Israel was within his command area as head of US European Command from 2003-06. It has been said that through that experience, Jones has come to think of NATO as a potential source of international troops for the region. The multilateral approach to resolving regional problems held by President Barack Obama will very likely bring about a closer working relationship between the US, Europe, the UN and even Russia [n.b., these are the members of the Quartet who developed the Road Map to carry out George Bush's "vision"] . Although France no longer holds the presidency of the EU, President Sarkozy’s proactive (some day hyperactive) foreign policy advances have already indicated a willingness to send French troops to the regional within a wider international force. The negotiations taking place in Egypt between Israel and Egypt, Hamas and Egypt, and Fatah and Hamas with Egypt ‘s help, may very likely also produce its own plan for a wider international presence in the region. Phase I of this plan might be in Gaza along the Rafah border with the introduction of a Turkish role alongside of the renewed EU monitors who will return if Fatah personnel regain a foothold at the border. That model could be expanded to other parts of Gaza as well as to the West Bank. Israel’s traditional position, expressed by Barak on October 1, 2000 and many times since, then has been to avoid the internationalization of the conflict at all costs. The last thing that Israel wants is European troops in Gaza who would prevent the possibility of a new version of a Cast Lead mission if rocket fire resumes from Gaza. Nonetheless, the most likely outcome of the war in Gaza, just like the war in Lebanon, is an international presence, starting in Gaza, and maybe later on in the West Bank”… This analysis was published in the JPost here.

Here, for the record, and for those who are interested, is the transcript of the Monday briefing in Washington DC: “Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell will travel to the Middle East and Europe from January 26 to February 3. On this trip, Special Envoy Mitchell will meet with senior officials to discuss the peace process and the situation in Gaza … As part of this trip, he will be visiting Egypt, Israel, the West Bank, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Special Envoy Mitchell will be accompanied by other State Department officials, including Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs David Hale, as well as representatives from the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. In addition, the traveling party will be joined in Jerusalem in Ramallah by Acting Assistant Secretary for Population, Refugees, and Migration Sam Witten, and USAID Special Assistant to the Administrator George Laudato.

The Administration will actively and aggressively seek a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as Israel and its neighbors. And in furtherance to these goals – or of these goals on this trip, Special Envoy Mitchell will work to consolidate the ceasefire in Gaza, establish an effective and credible anti-smuggling and interdiction regime to prevent the rearming of Hamas, facilitate the reopening of border crossings, and develop an effective response to the immediate humanitarian needs of the Palestinians in Gaza and eventual reconstruction and reinvigorate the peace process…

QUESTION: Is that the sum total of the places that he will visit, or is there any possibility of his going to other places?

MR. WOOD: There are always possibilities that he may travel to other places. We’ll try and keep you posted if, indeed, there are any changes to the schedule…
…
QUESTION: And … Is there any possibility of his having any contact, even indirect, say via the Egyptians, with Hamas?

MR. WOOD: He will not have contact with Hamas.
…
QUESTION: Is he likely to meet UN officials in Gaza, since he talks about the humanitarian situation, on the ground?

MR. WOOD: Well, he’s going to meet with officials of the region and talk about the overall situation on the ground and, of course, longer-term steps for trying to get us back on the road to peace.

QUESTION: But he’s not going to Gaza?
…
MR. WOOD: Well, I’ve given you what I have here. And again, if we have any updates, I’ll certainly be happy to provide them.

QUESTION: But does he have permission to travel to Gaza? I mean, is that an option?

MR. WOOD: Again, like I said, this is what I have for you in terms of travel. We’ll see what else – if there are any updates, we’ll try and get them to you.

QUESTION: Robert, in more of a broader clarification of exactly what he’s going to do, is he in listening mode or is he in –

MR. WOOD: Absolutely. He is in a listening mode. He wants to talk to all of the – he wants to talk to regional leaders and try to get, as I said, back – get the peace process back on track. And he’ll obviously be discussing the humanitarian situation. And he’s eager to get out to the region and begin working.

QUESTION: On the long-term process, you’re talking about advancing the peace process in a broader sense … Would you take into consideration his recommendation in 2001 that already talk about stopping violence, stopping Israeli settlement? Or is that past the point and you’re looking for a fresh start?

MR. WOOD: Look, he’s going out to listen. He wants to hear what the leaders have to say. And he’s going to report back to the Secretary and the President on his trip, and we’ll begin to continue formulating policy from there. But let’s let him to get to the region and have discussions, and then we’ll go from there.

QUESTION: Does he plan to pick up on the Annapolis process and where those negotiations were? Are you going to continue what the Bush Administration did? Is that your goal? … r do you have a whole bag of new tricks?

MR. WOOD: Well, again, he’s going to go out to the region, do his own assessment, and then report back to, as I said, the Secretary and the President, and then go from there.

QUESTION: But how do you see the Annapolis process? Dead, alive, half-alive?

MR. WOOD: We have a new Administration. It’s taking a look at a number of different policies from the previous administration. It will be coming up with its own initiatives. And so why don’t we just give it a little time and let, you know, Senator Mitchell do this work.

QUESTION: Do you regard the program of helping to build up the PA’s defense and security forces that General Dayton worked on as continuing?

MR. WOOD: That was very good work that was being carried out. And again, what we’re about is trying to strengthen and build up these Palestinian institutions so that one day, the Palestinian Authority will be able to, you know, basically manage the affairs of a new state once we get to that two-state solution.

QUESTION: But in using the phrase “that was very good work,” it suggests that there has been a kind of finite end to that program.

MR. WOOD: No, I’m not suggesting that. I’m just saying that, you know, it’s been good work that has been done. It’s important for us to continue to try to strengthen these Palestinian institutions. And that kind of work will continue.

QUESTION: But what – but you didn’t say the same thing about the Annapolis process.

MR. WOOD: Well, like I said to you, the Annapolis process was something that the previous administration had been undertaking.

QUESTION: Well, but the previous administration also undertook all that stuff on the security (inaudible).

MR. WOOD: Yeah, I’m just – what I’m saying is that was good work. Certainly, Annapolis was good work. But again, there’s a new Administration and it’s taking a look at overall Middle East policy, and the beginnings of that is Senator Mitchell’s trip to the region.
…
QUESTION: Can I just ask you one other thing on Mitchell?

MR. WOOD: Yeah.

QUESTION: Is he going to also be discussing Iran and how the region should approach Iran and its nuclear program?

MR. WOOD: Well, he’s going to be talking about the overall situation in the Middle East, and that obviously will have some – will in some way touch on the question of Iran. But I’m not going to get into any further details until he’s had a chance to go out to the region and have those discussions.
…

QUESTION: Just if I could come back to Gaza for a moment, there were some reports of U.S. Naval ships that had been stopping ships that might be suspected of bringing arms to Hamas. I mean, first of all, can you give us any guidance on that? And secondly, do you see any evidence that some of the elements of that memorandum of understanding that was signed, you know, are starting to really be put into force now?

MR. WOOD: Well, with regard to the ship, I’ll have to refer you to the Pentagon. In terms of the MOU, I mean, obviously, that’s an issue that Senator Mitchell will be discussing with, you know, countries in the region, and we’ll have to see where it goes from there …

Details continue to emerge.

The Egyptian draft calls for the creation of a new Palestinian unity government. The Egyptian proposal also says that democracy is the only option for the principle of rotation of authority while respecting law and order and legitimacy, and it says that support for democracy requires political participation of all parties without quotas. Hamas has been asking for a share of seats in the Palestinian National Council that is proportional to the votes that it won in the last Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006, when it beat Fatah in the balloting. The Egyptian proposal suggests a compromise on when to hold national elections, calling for simultaneous elections, but leaving the date open. It also proposes that the election law should be reviewed in accordance with the needs of the interest of the homeland. Fatah apparently wants both presidential and parliamentary elections to be held simultaneously in 2010 – with President Abbas apparently continuing in office until then. But Hamas says that Abbas’s term ends in January 2009, and has repeatedly said that it believes the present Palestinian Legislative Council must continue until the end of its term in January 2010. The Egyptian draft says the security apparatuses should be rebuilt on a professional and national basis away from factionalism, and that only the security apparatuses would be authorized to defend the homeland and the citizens, with “the required Arab assistance that is necessary to fulfill the process of building and reform”. And the Egyptian plan calls for the formation of committees to begin work immediately on all the proposals, saying that there is no restriction on an Arab participation in any of the committees upon the request of the organizations. The plan says the Palestine Liberation Organization should be re-activated according to a March 2005 Cairo agreement, to include all forces and factions. The Egyptian plan also calls for the election of a new Palestinian National Council “in the homeland and abroad, wherever it is possible”.

According to the proposed draft plan, the Palestinian political factions would agree that the management of the political negotiations is a prerogative of the PLO and the president of the PA. The plan says that any agreement resulting from these negotiations has to be presented before the Palestinian National Council for approval — or a referendum should be conducted “anywhere possible”.

This draft agreement seems to leave a lot of loopholes open – and seems to steer the reconciliation talks in the direction of having all the Palestinian parties conform with the Road Map and the desires of the Quartet of Middle East negotiators. Hamas has apparently expressed reservations on a number of items of the draft conciliation proposal. Hamas Spokesperson Fawzi Barhoum told AFP that Hamas would request some changes, but that it would “agree to the draft of the agreement and will not reject it, but there needs to be guarantees that what is agreed upon will be implemented,” Hamas Spokesperson Fawzi Barhoum told AFP. Some points need to be modified and some points need clarification, Barhoum said.

While the Egyptian plan proposes a reform of the Palestinian security forces, the Palestinian newspaper Al-Quds reported that Hamas has demanded the banishment of four security leaders who, Hamas says, are acting on a factional basis and who are the executors of a policy of arrests against Hamas leaders in the West Bank. By coincidence, YNet said, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas also wants to replace two of them — Tawfik Tirawi, head of the PA General Intelligence Service in the West Bank, who would actually be promoted, and appointed Abbas’ special advisor on security affairs with the rank of minister, and Diab al-Ali, commander of the Palestinian security forces in the West Bank. However, YNet added, the PA is concerned the changes would be perceived as capitulation to Hamas.

Ma’an News Agency reported that Tirawi was in fact dismissed on Tuesday. Ramattan says that he was removed due to professional rivalries. But, Ma’an quoted its sources as denying what was published by local and international news websites about Abbas intention to appoint a new chief of national security in West Bank to replace Diab Al-Ali (Abu Al-Fatah).

Then, on Thursday, JPOST correspondent Khaled Abu Toameh wrote that “Fatah officials on Wednesday criticized Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas’s decision to dismiss Gen. Tawfik Tirawi, commander of the PA’s General Intelligence Service, noting that the timing was particularly ‘problematic’. Abbas summoned Tirawi late Tuesday night to a meeting in the Mukata ‘presidential’ compound and informed him of the decision to fire him. Abbas offered to appoint Tirawi as his ‘adviser’ on security affairs and to promote him to the status of minister. However, Tirawi said shortly after the meeting that he was not interested in the new job and that he plans to travel to the United Kingdom to study English”.

Khaled Abu Toameh also wrote that “Abbas’s decision to fire Tirawi is believed to be linked to the PA president’s desire to patch up his differences with Hamas. On the eve of the decision, Hamas officials said they had requested that Abbas get rid of Palestinian security commanders responsible for the massive crackdown on the movement’s members and institutions in the West Bank. Tirawi, along with several top PA security officials, had been entrusted by the PA leadership in Ramallah with taking precautionary measures to prevent Hamas from extending its control to the West Bank…A senior Hamas official in the Gaza Strip told The Jerusalem Post that his movement had indeed demanded that Abbas replace Tirawi and other PA security commanders in the West Bank to pave the way for ending the crisis with Fatah. ‘We welcome Abbas’s decision to fire Tirawi, who was responsible for security coordination with the Israelis and who was behind the brutal measures against Hamas [in the West Bank’, the official said. ‘We hope Abbas will take similar measures against all those security chiefs who chose to work with Israel and the Americans against our people’.” The official said his movement was now expecting Abbas to remove Diab al-Ali, commander of the PA’s National ecurity Force in the West Bank, who is also known as a sworn enemy of Hamas. Last month al-Ali raised eyebrows when he threatened that his forces would not hesitate to use force to overthrow the Hamas government in the Gaza Strip.

Fatah is very unhappy, according to Khaled Abu Toameh: ” ‘The timing of the decision to fire Tirawi was very bad’, a Fatah official in Ramallah told the Post. ‘It appears as if President Abbas took the decision to appease Hamas’. Another Fatah operative condemned Abbas’s decision as ‘dangerous’, claiming it would deepen divisions inside Fatah. ‘Many people in Fatah are unhappy with the decision’, he said. ‘They believe that Abbas made a huge mistake’. The Fatah official said he did not rule out the possibility that Abbas’s decision was linked to his desire to extend his term in office beyond January 2009. ‘Some are talking about a secret deal between Abbas and Hamas that allows him to remain in power after his term expires next January’, he said. ‘Hamas wants the heads of the security commanders in the West Bank in return for agreeing to the extension of Abbas’s term. This doesn’t look good’. A senior PA official denied the charges, saying the decision had nothing to do with Hamas’s demand for the dismissal of Tirawi and other commanders. The official said that the decision was taken because Tirawi had refused to report to the PA government of Salaam Fayad in the West Bank.
According to the official, the decision was taken in the context of the US-backed efforts to reform the PA security forces by reducing their number. He added that the proposed reforms call for merging Tirawi’s General Intelligence Service with the rival Preventative Security Force and turning them into a single force that reports directly to Fayad’s government”.
This analysis can be read in full in the Jerusalem Post
here